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Abstract 
The current economic crisis has led several rich countries to experience severe fiscal 
deficits. Among other factors responsible for the situation, corruption is considered harmful 
to public finances and appears closely related to fiscal deficits. This paper opens a new 
avenue in addressing the effects of corruption on public deficits through fiscal 
decentralization. Focusing on a sample of 31 OECD countries over the period 1986-2010, 
we find that fiscal decentralization contributes to mitigating the perverse effects of 
corruption in public deficits. In addition, our findings indicate heterogeneity in the effect of 
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bringing the government closer to the people in relatively corrupt countries may lead to a 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, achieving sustainable public finances is a first order concern in rich countries. The current 
economic crisis has led several countries to experience severe fiscal deficits, going so far as to make it 
impossible for some of them to obtain funding without international bailouts. Among other factors 
responsible for this situation, corruption is considered an important institutional feature which is 
harmful to public finances and appears closely related to fiscal deficits. In the view of the World Bank 
(2012a), corruption “reduces the effectiveness of public administration and distorts public expenditure 
decisions, [...] erodes the rule of law and harms the reputation of and trust in the state”. More 
specifically, corruption leads to adverse budgetary consequences by decreasing state revenue and 
promoting wasteful spending. Corruption practices are associated with tax evasion, unofficial 
economy, illegal customs administration, irregular procurements, thefts and bribes or “white elephant” 
investment projects (World Bank, 2012b).  
As pointed out by Kaufmann (2010), it is interesting to note that, contrary to common belief, there 
exist large differences regarding the presence of corruption among industrialized countries. To get an 
overview of these differences, focusing on our sample of OECD countries, the Global Corruption 
Barometer 2006 of Transparency International reports bribe payments values ranging between 1 
percent (Finland, Sweden and Switzerland) and 17 percent (Czech Republic and Greece).1 With 
respect to the consequences on public finances, Kaufmann (2010) observes a strong relationship 
between corruption and fiscal deficits in rich countries. An illustration of this relationship is presented 
in Figure 1. 2 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Bearing this in mind, this paper opens a new avenue in accounting for the fact that the adverse effects 
of corruption on public deficits may be mitigated through fiscal decentralization. The intuition behind 
this proposition is that when the government does not work well, by misusing public office for private 
gain, a close citizen control of politicians is particularly necessary. The monitoring of political activity 
–in general– and fiscal management –in particular– can be facilitated by bringing the government 
closer to the people, which leads to higher information about local affairs and a higher degree of 
democracy and accountability. The same logic suggests that if corruption is absent, to decentralize 
                                                 
1 Literately, the question included in the Barometer is as follows: “In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in 
your household paid a bribe in any form?” (Transparency International, several years). 
2 See below for the explanation of the variables employed. 
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may be less necessary in this regard. In addition, it may be argued that in a context of rampant 
corruption, it is preferable to have several levels of government rather than an omnipotent and opaque 
central government that appears to be very far from citizen control. 
When one observes decentralization across OECD countries, the differences are striking. Considering 
the amount of subnational tax revenue as a percentage of total general government tax revenue, we 
find great variability within our sample over the period 1986-2010. The range runs from countries like 
Greece, with a value lower than one percent, to countries like Canada, with a value near 50 percent. 
Casual observation supports our argument. Greece, a country relatively corrupt, presents both the 
lowest level of fiscal decentralization and the highest deficit in the analyzed period. This stands in 
stark contrast to the experience of countries like Poland, which reports higher decentralization and 
lower deficits, despite having at least similar levels of corruption. The comparison of the two countries 
suggests a connection between more fiscal decentralization and fewer deficits. In contrast, among less 
corrupt countries, decentralization appears unrelated to public deficit. Thus, the Netherlands and 
Canada present similar levels of corruption and similar records of deficits, the former being much less 
decentralized than the latter. Table 1 summarizes the data of the four countries mentioned.3 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
These observations lead us to systematically study the relationship between corruption, fiscal 
decentralization and public deficit. Using a sample of 31 OECD countries, we show that the 
relationship between corruption and public deficit is nonlinear and varies with the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. Thus, we find that the effect of corruption on increasing fiscal deficit goes down as 
the level of decentralization rises. In addition, we observe that fiscal decentralization is related to 
lower deficit only in countries with higher levels of corruption, but not in less corrupt countries.  
Therefore, the central message this paper conveys is that fiscal decentralization mitigates the adverse 
effects of corruption on public deficit. We adopt several econometric approaches to provide empirical 
evidence supporting our main argument. First, we estimate cross-section and panel regressions for the 
                                                 
3 In general, the literature on fiscal decentralization predicts ambiguous effects on public deficits. On the one hand, to 
decentralize means bringing the government closer to the people and encourages competition among subnational 
jurisdictions. This leads to better information about local affairs, higher accountability, more efficient provision of 
public services, responsible fiscal management and moderate size of government (Oates, 1999; Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980). But decentralization is considered as a “double-edged sword”. Several problems have been 
identified, such as the risk of duplicating functions and wasting resources, coordination failures, a “race to the bottom” 
due to interjurisdictional competition –with the subsequent erosion of government revenue sources–, “soft budget 
constraints” and the lower expertise of local governments (Prud’homme, 1995; Weingast, 2009). 
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period 1986-2010 by using an interaction model where public deficit is explained through corruption, 
fiscal decentralization and an interaction term of both variables. Second, the sample is divided into 
three groups according to the level of corruption so that we can examine whether decentralization is 
related to lower deficit in each of them. For the first purpose, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
the system GMM estimator and, for the second, fixed effects models. The results hold for both revenue 
and expenditure indicators of decentralization and they are fairly robust to different specifications. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
corruption, fiscal federalism and public deficit, as well as outlines possible hypotheses about the 
impact of the interaction between corruption and decentralization on public deficits. Section 3 presents 
the methodological approach and takes a first look at the data. Section 4 presents the results from the 
main regression analysis. Section 5 provides several robustness checks as well as a complementary 
analysis that divides the sample into three groups according to the average corruption level and 
focuses on within-country variation. Section 6 puts forward some policy implications and concludes.  
2. Theoretical and empirical background 
Our research is placed between two well-differentiated branches of the institutional literature, namely, 
the consequences of corruption –on one side– and decentralization –on the other– in the economy and 
governance. We first review both branches separately and we then adopt an integrative view in order 
to interpret the interaction between corruption and decentralization. 
For more than a decade the consequences of corruption have been studied profusely by economists 
and political scientists. A seminal contribution on the effects of corruption on the economy is Mauro 
(1995, 1997), who finds that corruption reduces investment and hence economic growth. Since then, 
many authors have found evidence on the negative impact of corruption on different areas of 
economic activity, such as foreign direct investment, countries’ infrastructures, investment, public 
spending effectiveness or sustainable development (see, among others, Wei, 1997a and 1997b; Tanzi 
and Davoodi, 1998; Aidt et al., 2008; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008; Aidt, 2009). Regarding public 
finances, the World Bank (2012b) stresses that corruption is harmful to state coffers by decreasing 
state revenue and promoting wasteful spending. Corruption encourages tax evasion, tax regressivity 
and the unofficial economy. It is also associated with corrupt procurement with cost overrun, cases of 
theft, “white elephant” investment projects and purchasing of political support. High level of 
corruption reduces tax revenue particularly from social security tax and –to a lower extent– sales tax. 
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Extrabudgetary accounts (with lower political and administrative controls) and goods and services 
provided below market prices are also fertile grounds for corruption to flourish (Tanzi, 1999). In a 
study of US states, Depken and Lafountain (2006) find that corruption is related to lower bond rating, 
which implies the payment of a premium for state bonds. 
Focusing on industrialized countries, Kaufmann (2010) lists a number of channels whereby corruption 
can affect public finance, which can be divided into direct and indirect channels. The former are a) the 
erosion of tax revenue through evasion and ineffective tax collection institutions and b) the increase of 
public expenditures associated with inflated bureaucracies, expensive public investments and 
inefficient composition of public spending. The indirect channels are a) the rising cost of debt service 
and the lack of transparency of the financial sector, b) corrupt data of financial and national statistics, 
which leads to uncertainty and mistrust in the financial markets, c) the shadow economy, which leads 
to an increase in official tax rates to compensate for the overall fall in tax revenues, and d) lower 
productivity, competitiveness and growth (by raising –for instance– the cost of doing business), which 
are the ultimate sources of government revenue. Kaufmann (2010) finds that corruption is strongly 
related to fiscal deficits in rich countries. One standard deviation improvement in the corruption 
indicator leads to a 3.5 percentage point reduction in fiscal deficits. Besides Kaufmann’s work, very 
little has been done to investigate the relationship between corruption and public finance in rich 
countries. In this respect, we provide further evidence showing that corruption increases fiscal deficits 
in rich countries. 
Another extensively studied topic over the last two decades is the impact of decentralization on 
economic activity and governance. Nowadays, we are witnessing a global trend of devolution process 
(see, for instance, Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). Many states have conducted and are still involved 
in decentralization processes in order to achieve economic, social and democratic goals. Although 
initially decentralization initiatives were seen with optimism, scholars soon began to doubt about the 
merit of such endeavours. The attitude change was due, at least partially, to the dismal performance of 
subnational levels in some countries (Oates, 2008). Argentina and Brazil suffered severe fiscal crisis 
largely motivated by irresponsible behavior of subnational governments (Dillinger and Webb, 1999).4 
                                                 
4 We focus particularly on fiscal decentralization since our interest lies in the distribution of fiscal competences among 
different levels of government. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the different facets of decentralization 
are related among them. For example, vertical fiscal imbalances, –i.e., dependence on financial resources from higher 
levels of government–, endanger the political autonomy of subnational governments (Weingast, 2009). 
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The literature on fiscal federalism provides arguments both in favor and against decentralization. First 
of all, to decentralize means bringing the government closer to the people. This has many implications, 
namely, a higher level of knowledge and information about local affairs, leading to a more efficient 
and better provision of public services (Oates, 1999), and higher degree of democracy and 
accountability, allowing the control of corrupt behavior. Secondly, it has been argued that the 
existence of a number of sub-national jurisdictions encourages competition among them in order to 
satisfy people’s preferences. The widely known “Tiebout model” supports the fact that mobile 
households select those jurisdictions that better match with their preferences about public goods and 
taxes by voting “with their feet” (Tiebout, 1956). Officials and politicians will be compelled to a 
responsible management of fiscal resources and to provide valuable public services (Oates, 1999). 
Also, in a related fashion, a plurality of subnational governments is considered to favor the functioning 
of economic markets (“market-preserving federalism” –Weingast, 1995) and limit the size of the 
“Leviathan” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). For all these reasons, second generation fiscal federalism 
models stress the important role played by own revenue generation –tax autonomy– by subnational 
governments (Careaga and Weingast, 2003; Rodden, 2003).5 
Regarding the arguments against fiscal decentralization, interjurisdictional competition can generate a 
“race to the bottom” because it creates incentives for subnational governments to reduce tax rates and 
regulation standards in order to attract business to the jurisdiction. This erodes their revenue sources, 
thus causing serious fiscal imbalances. On the other hand, “soft budget constraints” and an excessive 
dependence on intergovernmental transfers are related to irresponsible fiscal management (Weingast, 
2009).6 Additionally, as mentioned by Treisman (2002), it has been argued that multi-tier governments 
are more likely to duplicate functions and waste resources. Likewise, when economies of scale exist, 
subnational governments are less efficient in providing public goods and services if they lack the 
adequate size (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). Other negative aspects of decentralization include 
coordination problems due to the presence of a high number of veto players and the lower capacity 
and skills of local governments (Prud’homme, 1995).  
                                                 
5 In favor of federalism, it has been also said that it allows for a higher degree of institutional and policy 
experimentation. A federal system offers the possibility of public policy innovation by a decentralized process of 
“learning-by-doing” in different circumscriptions (Oates, 1999). In the US there are several examples of federal 
policies that were designed and used formerly in subnational levels –for instance, the unemployment insurance, the 
taxation of gasoline and the regulation of emissions standards for motor vehicles (Oates, 2008). 
6 It is emphasized the importance of revenue generation by state and local governments. In a review of the second 
generation models of fiscal federalism, Weingast (2009) asserts that “subnational governments that raise a substantial 
portion of their own revenue tend to be more accountable to citizens, to provide market-enhancing public goods, and to 
be less corrupt” (p. 283). 
 
 
6
Several empirical works have addressed the question of the relationship between decentralization and 
public deficits. For a sample of 30 developed and developing countries during the period 1970-1995, 
De Mello (2000) finds subnational tax autonomy to be associated with larger deficits, which he relates 
to coordination failures in intergovernmental fiscal relations. Focusing on a sample of 17 federations, 
Rodden and Wibbels (2002) provide evidence that fiscal decentralization is associated with smaller 
overall deficits, particularly when subnational governments have wide autonomy over taxation. In 
contrast, public deficits increase as subnational governments rely more on intergovernmental transfers. 
Shah (2006) comes to the conclusion that decentralized fiscal systems permit (or facilitate) to a higher 
extent improved macroeconomic governance compared to centralized systems. In general, he finds 
fiscal decentralization to be related to better fiscal performance.7 In addition, Baskaran (2010) explores 
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public debt within a panel of 17 OECD countries 
from 1975 to 2001. His findings indicate that expenditure decentralization reduces public debt, 
whereas tax decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalances are  not significantly related to it. Baskaran 
(2012) analyzes the influence of sub-national tax autonomy in public deficits with a sample of 23 
OECD countries over the last quarter a century. Sub-national tax autonomy shows a U-shaped effect, 
so the ‘average OECD country’ could reduce the fiscal deficit by decreasing sub-national tax 
autonomy. 
We also find a paper by Neyapti (2010) that is related to our analysis. Her study shows that both 
expenditure and revenue decentralization reduce budget deficits for a sample of developing and 
developed countries over the period 1980-98. In addition, she uses an interaction model providing 
some preliminary evidence that the effect of fiscal decentralization on reducing budget deficits 
increases with population size and that the effect of expenditure decentralization is reduced when 
governance improves. Our analysis differs from Neyapti’s in several important respects. First, unlike 
her sample of 16 countries that only includes nine OECD countries (while the rest are developing 
countries as diverse as Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa), our 
dataset is based on a more homogeneous sample comprising 31 OECD countries. The advantage of 
doing so is that most OECD countries are characterized by having democratic regimes and relatively 
educated populations, and the risk of omitted variables bias and measurement errors is attenuated.8 
                                                 
7 In Shah’s view, that result is expected since decentralized fiscal systems imply clarity in the role of decision-making 
units, transparency in the rules and a careful institutional design thought to achieve fair play and restrict rent seeking 
behavior. 
8 So, taking as reference the year 2000, all of the 31 OECD countries of our sample are “Free” according to the 
Freedom House’s classification of political status. Regarding the level of education, which is important in order to 
make an effective control of government activity feasible, the secondary school enrolment is above 85% in all 
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This allows us to better identify the effects of fiscal decentralization and its interaction with corruption 
on fiscal deficits, thereby enabling us to provide some policy implications and advice better suited for 
industrialized countries. Second, by taking the period covering the years between 1986 and 2010 we 
are able to extend Neyapti’s time span by 12 years, which entails the most recent period in which tax 
and expenditure decentralization has intensified (Stegarescu, 2005).  
Third, while this author treats fiscal decentralization (as well as the other regressors) as exogenous, we 
allow all explanatory variables to be endogenous with respect to fiscal deficits.9 We deal with this 
issue by using the system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (2005) with both annual and 5-year 
average data (which should also help to correct for real business cycle effects) versus the pooled OLS 
estimator of Neyapti that fails to accommodate the presence of endogeneity in the regressors. Fourth, 
whereas she interacts –in only one model– fiscal decentralization with a broad measure of governance 
which includes a wide variety of factors such as control of corruption, rule of law, political instability, 
government efficiency, voice accountability and regulatory quality, our paper focuses the whole 
empirical analysis on corruption and its interaction with fiscal decentralization. We do so because 
corruption is the aspect of governance that is generally emphasized in both the theoretical and 
empirical literature on fiscal decentralization and fiscal outcomes.10 Fifth, we conduct extensive 
robustness checks where we introduce many additional control variables, test the presence of outliers 
and even use alternative empirical approaches. Not surprisingly, our results differ substantially from 
Neyapti for the revenue decentralization measure. Whereas we find robust evidence that tax 
decentralization leads to lower deficits only in countries with high corruption, her evidence points to 
the fact that “governance [does] not seem to influence the effectiveness of revenue decentralization” 
(Neyapti, 2010, p. 161). 
After reviewing the literature on the consequences of corruption and decentralization in public finance, 
we raise the question of what the effect of their interaction is. Is the effect of corruption independent 
of the level of decentralization? Does fiscal decentralization mitigate or aggravate the adverse effects 
of corruption on public deficit? What result is to be expected from that interaction? An a priori answer 
is necessarily ambiguous. On the one hand, decentralization may exacerbate public finance 
                                                                                                                                                        
countries (World Bank, 2011). In addition, common forces such as economic integration measured by trade and 
financial openness are found to increase fiscal decentralization in the OECD (Stegarescu, 2009). 
9 It is not difficult to show how, for instance, GDP growth affects negatively fiscal deficits and how the latter in turn 
reduces economic growth by inducing spending cuts and tax increases. 
10 In addition, while the governance indicator is only available since 1996, our corruption measure from the 
International Country Risk Guide is available for the whole period under scrutiny (1986-2010). 
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mismanagement in a corrupt context. Local government may be captured by local elites and corrupt 
politicians without proper citizen control. Political patronage is another pathology of corrupt 
governments that may be aggravated at local levels, with negative consequences for spending and 
revenue decisions. More actors involved in fiscal management implies that the pie must be divided 
into more pieces, which may lead to more private appropriation of public funds. In addition, 
coordination problems and fiscal imbalances may be exacerbated when corruption exists, since budget 
monitoring and public finance transparency tend to be lower. Hence, a plausible hypothesis is that 
when the government is corrupt, many government levels will worsen rather than improve the 
situation.11 
However, a more optimistic view is possible. A corrupt government is characterized by opaqueness 
and lack of accountability, whose decisions are taken without citizen control. In this case, central 
government is a Leviathan that extracts rents from population and uses them for private gain of 
politicians and officials. Decentralizing fiscal powers gives citizens the opportunity to increase the 
control of public money management. Arguably, if the central government is corrupt, fiscal 
decentralization is more necessary as an institutional mechanism that helps to prevent the irresponsible 
management of public funds. A government closer to the people is a government subject to more 
oversight and more effective accountability. This is because citizens are more interested and informed 
about local affairs, thereby being better able to punish irresponsible political behavior, for instance, 
through subnational and local elections. By contrast, when government is transparent and open, and 
politicians and public employees honest and upright, then the central government may function well 
without need for decentralization. Although it may be argued that decentralization –as well as 
democracy– is always desirable, in a context of low corruption it is less necessary because the 
government performs properly and does not misuse public funds. In this case, citizen control is not so 
                                                 
11 A related question is whether decentralization increases corruption. Fisman and Gatti (2002) obtain a strong and 
significant effect of government expenditure decentralization on reducing corruption. Along similar lines, Ivanyna and 
Shah (2010), focusing on the local government level for a large sample of countries, find that local fiscal 
decentralization has a significant negative effect on the incidence of corruption. This would accord with the prediction 
of theoretical models such as the ones by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) for which 
greater decentralization limits corruption by raising competition among subnational governments. Arikan (2004) 
provides less clear-cut evidence of a reduction in corruption due to higher decentralization, since only about half of the 
decentralization coefficients appear statistically significant. In contrast, using measures of corruption experiences and a 
large sample of countries around the world, Fan et al. (2009) point to the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking when 
government structures increase in complexity. In this sense, a larger number of tiers and a larger local staff –“with 
pockets to fill” – increase the chances of “overgrazing” in the rents of public office. In conclusion, these works show 
that there is no consensus about the effect of decentralization on corruption. 
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essential, and one can expect the positive effect of fiscal decentralization on reducing budget deficits 
to be lower in a transparent country.12 
Since there is theoretical ambiguity about the effect of the interaction between corruption and 
decentralization on fiscal deficits, an empirical inquiry is warranted. This is what we do in the rest of 
the paper. 
3. Methodology and data 
We select a sample of 31 OECD countries, which includes all current members except Chile, Mexico 
and Turkey, due to missing data. The use of a sample of rich countries has several advantages, such as 
greater data availability and lower heterogeneity across countries. This last aspect implies that we are 
comparing relatively homogeneous countries, with well-developed economies and democratic 
regimes. When analyzing the mechanism by which decentralization affects governance, it is important 
to keep in mind the features characterizing the countries included in our sample (high average levels of 
education and income, political freedom, levels of corruption relatively lower than non-OECD 
countries, and so on). Also, this greater sample homogeneity leads to more meaningful results and 
reduces the risk of omitted variable bias. The period under scrutiny spans from 1986 to 2010, since 
available data on corruption begin in the mid-eighties. The source of institutional data is the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) produced by the Political Risk Services Group (PRS Group, 
2012). 
Firstly, we estimate an interaction model where public deficit is explained by corruption, fiscal 
decentralization, the interaction between these two and several control variables. We calculate cross-
section regressions with OLS by averaging the variables over the whole period. This can be thought of 
as the analysis of the long-term relationship between the variables under study. We also estimate panel 
regressions in order to exploit the time variation of the data, using both annual and five-year averaged 
data. In this case, we use pooled OLS and the system GMM estimator. Secondly, we divide the sample 
into three groups based on the average level of corruption. This exercise can be proven meaningful 
since corruption –as many other institutional variables– is remarkably persistent over time.13 With 
                                                 
12 Likewise, one can argue that other disciplining mechanisms working in decentralized governments such as 
jurisdictional competition play a more important role when corruption is higher. We will insist on this point in Section 
5.3. 
13 In order to check the persistence of corruption over time, we can divide the sample into two periods (1984-1997 and 
1998-2010) and calculate the average value of corruption for each country in both periods (using ICRG data). The 
correlation between the two periods is 0.87. 
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countries classified into three groups, we ask whether there are significant cross-country differences 
regarding the effect of decentralization on public deficits. For that purpose, we use a fixed effects 
model, which controls for all time-invariant characteristics and exploits within country variations. In 
this way, corruption is held constant and instead we focus on the variation in fiscal decentralization. 
Regarding the measure of corruption, we concentrate on public corruption and adopt a widely 
extended definition of corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain (see, among others, 
Tanzi, 1999). Our main measure is a perception-based indicator from the ICRG (hereafter, ICRG 
corruption). This indicator assesses, on a scale of 0 to 6, the presence of corruption within the political 
system.14 It measures different facets of corruption, such as financial corruption (requirements of 
special payments and bribes), political patronage, “wire-pulling”, secret party funding, and ties 
between politics and business (PRS Group, 2012). We prefer this variable over other alternatives due 
to the greater time span availability. Unlike our corruption measure, the indicators Control of 
Corruption from the World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010) and Corruption 
Perceptions Index from Transparency International are only available since 1996 and 1995, 
respectively. Experience-based indicators from comparable international surveys are much more 
limited both in the time dimension and in the sample of countries covered. Correlations among 
perception-based indicators are high, indicating that they are measuring more or less the same thing; 
while correlations among these indicators and experience-based indicators are lower.15 
With respect to fiscal decentralization, our preferred indicator is subnational (state/regional and local) 
tax revenue as a percentage of total general government tax revenue (hereafter, subnational tax 
revenue), which is a measure of revenue decentralization and comes from the OECD Fiscal 
Decentralisation Database (OECD, 2012a). This indicator is interesting because it focuses on tax 
revenue generated at subnational levels, rather than other sources of revenue such as 
intergovernmental transfers, which depend on the central government. It has been argued that 
decentralization based on own revenue leads to more accountability, less corruption, more market-
enhancing public goods and more political autonomy (Weingast, 2009). Nevertheless, our indicator is 
imperfect, since it does not reflect the degree of autonomy of subnational governments in deciding the 
                                                 
14 Country-specific annual scores are computed as the average over the 12 months for each year (PRS Group, 2012). 
This makes the variable take values over the continuum between 0 and 6. We rescale the variable so that higher scores 
imply more corruption. 
15 The correlation of ICRG corruption with Control of Corruption is 0.82 (N = 337) and with Corruption Perception 
Index 0.76 (N = 478). The correlation with the variable bribe payments (percentage of population paying bribes in the 
last year), an experience-based indicator from the Global Corruption Barometer, is 0.53 (N = 134). 
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tax characteristics (tax base, rates, reliefs, etc.). Stegarescu (2005) –following the classification 
proposed by the OECD (1999)– provides a measure of subnational tax autonomy (that spreads until 
2001) by selecting only autonomous own tax revenue of subnational governments, that is, those for 
which sub-central government determines the tax rate and/or the tax base. For robustness purposes, we 
update Stegarescu’s best measure of tax decentralization (i.e. TD1) by using the information about tax 
autonomy of state and local governments provided by the Fiscal Decentralization Database of the 
OECD for the years 2002, 2005 and 2008 (OECD, 2012a). Remarkably, the subnational tax revenue 
and TD1 indicators are strongly correlated.16 In addition, in order to test whether the effect of 
expenditure decentralization is different from that of tax decentralization, we also estimate regressions 
using “subnational government expenditure as a percentage of total general government expenditure” 
–hereafter, subnational govern. expend. (OECD, 2012a). 
Our dependent variable is general government deficit over GDP obtained from the Economic Outlook 
of the OECD (2012b). We do not use subnational or central deficits because what matters is the 
behavior of the whole political system. Moreover, irresponsible fiscal policies of subnational 
governments may not be associated with higher subnational deficits if the central government issues 
debt and increases transfers to subnational units. As Treisman (2002) notes, it makes no sense to 
advocate decentralization on the basis of better local government performance when it is offset by a 
deterioration of central government accounts.  
In all the estimations we always include a basic set of control variables. Total government revenue 
over GDP is included to control for countries’ capacity to collect taxes and for government size. The 
expected sign is ambiguous since greater revenue capacity allows covering expenditures, but large 
governments are related to economic inefficiencies and distortions. Real per capita GDP growth and 
unemployment rate control for business cycle effects. We expect economic growth to reduce and 
unemployment rate to increase fiscal deficits. The logarithm of per capita GDP is also included to 
control for the level of economic development. The effect of this variable is uncertain since wealthier 
countries are associated with a higher demand for goods and services provided by the government (the 
Wagner’s law) but also these countries can afford more effective tax administration and are less likely 
to be affected by tax evasion. Finally, population is introduced due to the important variability in the 
                                                 
16 The correlation between subnational tax revenue and Stegarescu’s indicator of tax decentralization is 0.874 (N = 
357). After updating the indicator, the correlation is almost identical (0.875, N = 403). 
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size of the countries in the sample and because it probably affects public finances (scale effects, for 
instance) and promotes decentralization.17 
Before starting the regression analysis, Table 2 provides a first look at the relationship between 
corruption, fiscal decentralization and public deficit. Countries are classified into three groups 
according to their level of corruption.18 Within each group, countries are separated on the basis of their 
degree of tax decentralization. The entries represent the average values over the period 1986-2010. 
The aggregate data for each group (rows with bold letters) reveal a positive association between 
corruption and public deficit, which fits with the relationship depicted in Figure 1 (see Introduction). 
We see that more corrupt countries exhibit higher deficits, being the difference relative to less corrupt 
countries of nearly 4 percentage points (3.98 vs. 0.08). In each corruption group, one observes that 
corruption affects deficits differently depending on tax decentralization. Considering the ‘high 
corruption group’, less decentralized countries suffer higher deficits than more decentralized ones, 
with a difference of 3.5 percentage points.19 In the ‘intermediate corruption group’, less decentralized 
countries also suffer higher deficits, but the difference with respect to more decentralized ones is lower 
(0.68 percentage points). Finally, focusing on the ‘low corruption group’, we observe a very different 
pattern. In this case, less decentralized countries experience lower deficits than those more 
decentralized, the difference being 2.3 percentage points. Therefore, this preliminary evidence 
indicates heterogeneity in the relationship between decentralization and public deficit, depending on 
the level of corruption. Fiscal decentralization is related to lower public deficits in a context of 
relatively high corruption, but not in a context of low corruption. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Regression analysis 
4.1 Cross-section regressions analysis 
We estimate in this section a basic interaction model of the following form:  
                                                 
17 The definitions and sources of the variables are presented in Appendix I. The descriptive statistics are provided in an 
unpublished appendix available from the authors upon request. 
18 We calculate the average value of our main indicator of corruption, ICRG corruption, by using all available data (the 
period 1984-2010). Then, countries are divided by the 33th and 66th percentiles of this variable. More details are 
provided in subsection 5.2. 
19 Note that this difference is not simply due to a higher level of corruption among less decentralized countries. In fact, 
the level of corruption is higher among more decentralized countries (2.67 vs. 2.20). 
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iiiiii Xdecentrcorruptiondecentrcorruptiondeficit   321         (1) 
where deficiti is general government deficit, α is a constant term, corruptioni is our main corruption 
indicator (ICRG corruption), decentri represents fiscal decentralization, corruption×decentri stands for 
the interaction term between the last two variables, Xi is a vector of control variables and εi is the error 
term.20 All the variables are included as the average over the period 1986-2010.  
Table 3 reports results from cross-section regressions estimated with OLS. Column 1 shows the basic 
model without fiscal decentralization variables. Corruption is significantly related to higher fiscal 
deficits. An increase by one standard deviation in corruption (0.89) is associated with an increase of 
1.15 percentage points in public deficit. The next column adds subnational tax revenue, which enters 
with a negative and significant coefficient. Now, corruption appears statistically insignificant. But 
since we suspect the existence of heterogeneity in the relationship between corruption and public 
deficit depending on the degree of fiscal decentralization, column 3 includes the interaction term 
between corruption and tax decentralization. In this model the interpretation of the coefficients is very 
different. The coefficient on corruption shows the effect on public deficit when subnational tax 
revenue is equal to zero, while the negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the effect 
of corruption on fiscal deficit decreases as tax decentralization increases. Therefore, we must conduct 
a conditional interpretation of the marginal effect of corruption for each value of tax decentralization 
(see Brambor et al., 2006). The marginal effect is given by: 
decentr
corruption
deficit 

31 
    (2)
 
where β1 is the coefficient on corruption and β3 the coefficient on the interaction term. It is also 
necessary to properly calculate the standard error of the marginal effect, which is given by (see Aiken 
and West, 1991):21 
)ˆˆcov(2)ˆvar()ˆvar(ˆ 313
2
1  

 decentrdecentr
corruption
deficit
   (3)
 
At the bottom of Table 3, we calculate the marginal effects and standard errors of corruption for 
different values of tax decentralization (percentiles 10th to 90th). The marginal effect of corruption on 
                                                 
20 Note that the model includes all constitutive terms of the interaction. In order for coefficients to be meaningful, 
Brambor et al. (2006) show that interaction models must comprise all constitutive terms of the interaction. 
21 In an interaction model, for interpretation purposes, the relevant standard errors are those calculated in this way 
rather than the standard errors of the constitutive or interaction terms (Brambor et al., 2006). 
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public deficit is positive and significant only when tax decentralization is low. For values equal or 
greater than the 50th percentile, that is, subnational tax revenue equal to 10.5%, the marginal effect is 
no longer significant and even the sign changes (see column 3). Regarding the control variables, 
economic growth and unemployment show the expected negative and positive signs, both variables 
being statistically significant. Total government revenue as a percentage of GDP presents a negative 
but insignificant coefficient, as it is the case also for per capita GDP. Population appears with a 
positive coefficient, sometimes statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
It is interesting to note that we are controlling for government revenue, economic growth, and so on, 
which are some of the potential indirect channels through which corruption can affect public deficits 
(Kaufmann, 2010). For comparison purposes, column 4 excludes the set of control variables. As 
expected, the impact of corruption is now larger and tax decentralization contributes to a lower extent 
to reduce this effect. Thus, the threshold of tax decentralization beyond which corruption does not 
increase public deficit is now higher. Columns 5 to 7 are equivalent to columns 2 to 4 but with 
subnational govern. expend. as an alternative indicator of fiscal decentralization. The conclusions 
derived from this alternative indicator are similar22, even though Australia, Greece and Japan are 
omitted due to unavailable data on expenditure decentralization. Figure 2 depicts the marginal effect 
of corruption on public deficit depending on the degree of fiscal decentralization. The figure 
summarizes the main finding of the paper: corruption raises public deficit when fiscal decentralization 
is low, whereas no significant effect is found when the degree of decentralization increases.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Finally, it is possible to read the results from a different angle, namely, focusing on the marginal effect 
of fiscal decentralization depending on the level of corruption. This is what we do in Figure 3, which 
reports heterogeneity in the marginal effect of tax and expenditure decentralization, depending on the 
corruption level. Interestingly, when corruption is low the impact of fiscal decentralization is 
insignificant, but as corruption becomes more prevalent, decentralizing decreases fiscal deficits. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
                                                 
22 To interpret the results, one must keep in mind the range of variation of fiscal decentralization indicators. While 
values for subnational tax revenue vary from 0.9 to 46.4, subnational govern. expend. ranges from 10.3 to 61. 
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4.2 Panel data analysis 
We now turn to panel estimation methods to further test the empirical regularity found. This is 
appropriate for several reasons. Panel estimations exploit the temporal variation in the data, thus 
improving efficiency. Also, some variables change significantly over time, so taking averages for 
extended periods is not highly recommended. Moreover, better estimators are available to control for 
endogeneity by using lags of the variables as instruments. We use both annual and averaged data over 
5-year intervals for our computations, since it is unclear the exact time frame one should expect before 
corruption and decentralization changes influence public deficits. 
Table 4 presents the results from the panel analysis using subnational tax revenue as the fiscal 
decentralization indicator. The first two columns show the coefficients obtained with pooled OLS, 
where we also include time-specific effects (year dummies) to account for common shocks affecting 
all countries in a given period.23 Column 1 indicates that corruption is strongly associated with public 
deficits, while the next column shows that the effect of corruption depends on the degree of tax 
decentralization. Compared to cross-section analysis (Table 3), in this case a higher level of 
decentralization is necessary for the effect of corruption to cease to be significant (subnational tax 
revenue around 20%). The results remain unaltered in columns 5 and 6 that employ data averaged over 
5-year intervals. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
However, pooled OLS only serves as a first approximation. Other methods are necessary to control for 
countries’ permanent characteristics as well as for endogeneity problems. Fixed effects models with 
country-specific effects are not recommended in this case due to the fact that our main explanatory 
variable –corruption– is highly persistent over time and many of the regressors are thought to be 
endogenous. The difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) addresses endogeneity 
problems by using previous realizations of the regressors to instrument for their current values in the 
first-differenced specification. However, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
show that in the case of highly persistent regressors, lagged levels of the variables are weak 
instruments for the first-differenced regressors. This leads to a fall in precision as well as to biased 
coefficients. In order to overcome these shortcomings, these authors recommend the use of the system 
GMM estimator that utilizes instruments in levels and first-differences to improve in efficiency. 
                                                 
23 Strictly speaking, this estimator is labelled as one-way fixed effect model with time dummies. 
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Consequently, we will estimate the model using this estimator, which employs previous realizations of 
the regressors to instrument for their current values in the first-differenced specification and the lagged 
differences for the regression in levels. In order to avoid using an excessive number of instruments in a 
context with a relatively short cross-country dimension, we follow the suggestion of Roodman (2009) 
and limit the set of instruments to the minimum, i.e. to the first available: 2itx  for the specification in 
first-differences and 1 itx  for the specification in levels.24 We use the one-step estimator since 
standard errors for the two-step estimator are biased downwards. We apply orthogonal deviations, 
which help to maximize the sample size in panels with gaps, like ours (Roodman, 2006). All our 
regressors are treated as endogenous variables (except time-period dummies). 
The consistency of the system estimator depends on the validity of the instruments and the absence of 
serial correlation of second-order in the first-differenced error term. Therefore, we test these 
assumptions using the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions and the test for second-order 
autocorrelation proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Failure to reject the null hypotheses of overall 
validity of the instruments and absence of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced error 
for the respective tests would give support to the model. 
Columns 3 and 7 confirm that corruption increases public deficit. The interaction models specified in 
columns 4 and 8 show that this effect is conditioned to the level of tax decentralization. They indicate 
that a one point increase in the corruption index leads to about 1.4 and 1.5 percentage points rises in 
public deficits when subnational tax revenue is lower than the 10th percentile. However, as the degree 
of decentralization rises, the effect of corruption becomes smaller, being insignificant at sufficiently 
high levels of decentralization (60th percentile). Moreover, it is important to note that the Hansen test 
for over-identifying restrictions and the test for second-order serial correlation are not rejected, thereby 
supporting the validity of the model. 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1 Sensitivity analyses of baseline results 
                                                 
24 An additional way to further reduce the instrument set would be to only instrument for corruption, decentralization 
and their interaction. But this has the shortcoming that several other regressors are clearly endogenous to fiscal 
balances due to the operation of automatic stabilizers over the cycle such as GDP growth and the unemployment rate. 
If left uncontrolled, endogeneity would bias the results. Therefore, we opt for instrumenting all the regressors with the 
minimum possible instrument set: 2itx  and 1 itx . 
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In this section we conduct sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our baseline results. We 
begin with Table 5 that introduces subnational govern. expend. as an alternative fiscal decentralization 
indicator. Remarkably, we find the same pattern observed in Table 4. The main difference is that in the 
panel with data averaged over 5-year intervals, when using the system GMM estimator, the effect of 
corruption becomes insignificant at a lower threshold, namely, when expenditure decentralization 
reaches the 20th percentile (see column 4).   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 analyzes the robustness of our reference estimation, which is the panel based on 5-year 
averages using the system GMM estimator. Column 2 presents the results for an alternative tax 
decentralization measure which is an updated version of Stegarescu’s TD1 indicator using OECD 
information for the data points 2002, 2005 and 2008.25 It is remarkable that our main finding regarding 
the heterogeneity in the effect of fiscal decentralization remains robust to the use of this alternative tax 
decentralization indicator. As in the baseline analysis, we find that for values of tax decentralization 
greater than the 50th percentile, the positive marginal effect of corruption becomes insignificant. 
Hence, the effect of corruption on fiscal deficits is significantly positive when tax decentralization is 
relatively low, whereas corruption does not significantly affect fiscal balances if a country is highly 
decentralized. 
The remaining columns introduce additional control variables which are thought to affect fiscal 
deficits in industrialized economies or at least have some effect on it through either fiscal 
decentralization or corruption. Debt service proxies for interest payments that in the short-run are 
mostly affected by the existing stock of debt, which have an immediate positive influence on current 
deficits. The government bond yield at a 10-year maturity tries to capture the fact that debt interest 
payments above some threshold can generate a permanent increase in the public deficit of sufficient 
magnitude as to make the stock of public debt unsustainable. The current financial crisis has also 
shown how important high interest rates on sovereign bonds are as a disciplining mechanism of 
international investors on governments (acting as a “hard budget constraint”), thus leading to lower 
future fiscal deficits. The fiscal cost of a banking crisis controls for the effect that financial distress 
                                                 
25 In order to update Stegarescu’s TD1 indicator, we calculate the share of sub-central tax revenues on which sub-
central government has discretion over tax rates and/or tax bases –a) to c) components of the OECD classification of 
taxing power (OECD, 2012a)– as a percentage of general government total tax revenue. Then, we link Stegarescu’s 
data with the new series by applying the growth rate of these ratios to the former to avoid structural change in the 
series. 
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and bank bailouts can bring on public sector deficits. As an alternative measure, we also employ a 
dummy variable for the years where a banking crisis was in place. The dummy federal represents the 
presence of a federalist constitution implying a legislated division of powers between central and 
subnational authorities. This variable tries to control for the possibility of overgrazing in federal 
constitutions due to multiple and sometimes overlapping layers of government.26 Government and 
parliament fragmentation are variables that depend on the efficiency of decentralization according to 
Persson and Tabellini (2003). The other controls (inflation rate, trade openness, freedom of press, 
democracy indicator (polity2) and the square of tax decentralization) are factors that can affect fiscal 
deficits either directly or through their effect on corruption.27 
The results are reported in columns 3 to 14 of Table 6. In all cases, our baseline results remain fairly 
robust, while debt service, freedom of press, the banking crisis dummy, democracy and the square 
term appear with significant coefficients (with a positive sign for the five variables).28 In addition, as a 
further sensitivity analysis we check for the possible influence of outliers by excluding countries one 
at a time. We also delete observations whose standardized residuals are higher than two in absolute 
value. The evidence obtained indicates that the results are neither driven by any particular country nor 
by observations with high residuals.29 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.2 Within-country effects: An alternative empirical approach 
The above results can be read from the angle of the effect of decentralization on public deficits 
depending on countries’ corruption levels: decentralization only leads to lower public deficits when 
the level of corruption is high. This section makes a complementary analysis to further explore this 
non-linear effect by using an alternative approach. We divide the sample into three groups according 
to the average level of corruption and then we analyze whether there are significant differences among 
them regarding the effect of decentralization on public deficits. In this way, corruption is held constant 
and considered a country feature that only changes very gradually over time, and instead we focus on 
                                                 
26 Indeed, Treisman (2000) provides robust evidence that federal states are more corrupt. 
27 Focusing on a broad cross-section of 64 countries over the period 1980-2000, Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) 
provide evidence that a free press is necessary for fiscal decentralization to reduce the extent of corruption. 
28 Note that the freedom of press indicator ranges from 0 to 100, where a higher value implies lower press freedom. 
29 We do not report these regressions for space considerations. They are available in the unpublished appendix. 
Likewise, in the unpublished appendix we also provide the results using annual data. Remarkably, our main findings 
hold irrespective of the frequency of the data considered. 
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the variation in fiscal decentralization.30 We expect to find heterogeneity in the relationship between 
this variable and public deficit across the three groups of countries. Decentralization is expected to 
have more negative effects on public deficits in the group with higher corruption. 
A fixed effects model is used in order to focus on “within-country variation”. Thus, by controlling for 
all time-invariant characteristics, we ask for each group whether countries are more likely to reduce 
the public deficit as they become more decentralized. More specifically, the equation to estimate is: 
titititi
tititi
Xcorrhighdecentr
corrdecentrdecentrdeficit
,,,3
,2,1,
_
_int



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      (4)
 
where decentr×int_corri,t and decentr×high_corri,t are the interaction terms between fiscal 
decentralization and the intermediate and high corruption groups, respectively; αi and θt are sets of 
country and time specific effects and the remaining variables are the same as in Section 4. β1 estimates 
the effect of decentralization on public deficits for the “low corruption group” and β2 and β3 measure 
the differences with respect to that group.31 
Table 7 presents the results obtained from the fixed effects model for our main indicator of fiscal 
decentralization (subnational tax revenue). Column 1 shows high heterogeneity in the coefficient on 
tax decentralization across corruption groups for the panel based on annual data. The coefficient is 
positive and significant for the countries included in the “low corruption group”. The “intermediate 
corruption group” shows a coefficient on tax decentralization significantly different from the previous 
one, being its value close to zero (-0.63 + 0.62 = -0.01). The coefficient associated with the “high 
corrupt group” is also significantly different from the reference group and negative (-0.82 + 0.62 = -
0.20). Therefore, there is clear-cut heterogeneity in the effect of tax decentralization across corruption 
groups. Remarkably, this variable is related to lower deficits only in relatively corrupt countries. 
                                                 
30 We average the indicator ICRG corruption over the period 1984-2010 (all available years). Taking long-term 
averages makes sense because corruption is a highly persistent institutional characteristic. In this way, we reduce 
measurement error and avoid doubts about the accuracy of corruption and other government indicators to capture the 
temporal variation of the data (Treisman, 2007; Arndt and Oman, 2006). The “high corruption group” comprises those 
countries with average values of corruption higher than the 66th percentile, the “intermediate corruption group” those 
with average values between the 33th and 66th percentiles, and the “low corruption group” those with values below the 
33th percentile. Table 2 shows the countries included in each group. We create a dummy variable for each corruption 
group. 
31 Hence, the effect of fiscal decentralization on public deficits for the intermediate and high corruption groups are (β1 
+ β2) and (β1 + β3), respectively. The significance level of β2 and β3 indicates whether differences with respect to β1 are 
statistically significant; therefore, these two coefficients allow us to test the presence of heterogeneity in the effect of 
fiscal decentralization. 
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
We test whether the previous results are due to the particular classification of countries made with 
ICRG corruption. Columns 2 to 4 use alternative indicators to create the groups. Column 2 utilizes 
Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International, while column 3 uses Control of 
Corruption from the World Bank Governance Indicators. The resulting classifications are very similar 
to the previous one, despite the use of different sources and period coverage.32 Consequently, the 
results shown in columns 2 and 3 are very consistent with those of column 1. Rather than a perception-
based indicator, column 4 uses bribe payments, a measure of actual corruption experiences obtained 
from the Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International.33 Although in this case there are 
three countries with missing data (Estonia, Slovak Republic and Belgium) and matches with the 
reference classification are lower (68%), the results appear highly consistent. The effect of tax 
decentralization on public deficit is heterogeneous across corruption groups and is only significantly 
negative for the “high corruption group”.  
Columns 5 to 8 repeat the above analysis but using data averaged over 5-year intervals. The results 
remain remarkably robust: the coefficient on tax decentralization is positive for the “low corruption 
group”, while for the other two groups the coefficient is significantly lower, being very close to zero 
for the intermediate group and negative for the “high corruption group”. 
To sum up, this subsection has shown from a different approach the presence of heterogeneity in the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and public deficit depending on the level of corruption. 
Focusing on “within-country variation”, we observe that decentralizing public finances is associated 
with a reduction in fiscal deficits only in relatively more corrupt countries. 
5.3 Discussion of results 
In this subsection we try to discuss the theoretical mechanisms that could help us to explain the fact 
that decentralization only leads to lower public deficits when the level of corruption is high, whereas it 
does not reduce fiscal deficits in a context with low corruption. The line of arguments provided is 
essentially associated with the fact that in a corrupt environment, fiscal decentralization brings about 
                                                 
32 Due to data availability, we take the average over the years 1996-2009. Matches between classifications made with 
ICRG indicator and Corruption Perception Index are 87.1%, and between classifications made with ICRG indicator 
and Control of Corruption are 96.8%. 
33 We take the average over the years 2006-2010. 
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some disciplining mechanisms such as local accountability or greater interjurisdictional competition 
that can mitigate the negative effect of corruption on fiscal balances. In contrast, when the government 
is diligent and honest, fiscal decentralization has less scope to discipline fiscal management, and as a 
result, the effect on reducing fiscal deficits is less clear. 
Arikan (2004) develops a tax-competition model with rent-seeking that predicts that a horizontal rise 
in the number of jurisdictions that compete for residents and business investment reduces corruption 
through a fall in the revenue expropriated by rent-seeking bureaucrats. Along similar lines, in 
Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) interjurisdictional competition lowers the possibilities and 
incentives for rent-seeking on the part of political officials. Establishing hard-budget constraints make 
local officials responsible for financing the cost of public goods provision, thus acting as a disciplining 
mechanism of local accountability. However, in their absence, i.e. when soft-budget constraints34 and 
implicit bailout from the central government prevail, local officials will be more prone to pursuing 
rent-seeking and over-invoicing in the provision of public goods.35 In this particular case, the existence 
of municipal or state elections can serve as an alternative disciplining device to raise local 
accountability, thus helping to prevent corrupt behavior among local officials. 
The rationale for decentralizing tax and expenditure decision-making to the lower levels of 
government lays in the fact that peer monitoring can take place to directly control agents’ behavior 
(Stiglitz, 1999). Fiscal decentralization aligns spending and funding responsibilities, which improves 
the efficiency in the provision of public goods. Along these lines, Hindricks and Lockwood (2009) and 
Weingast (2009) emphasize that greater fiscal autonomy enhances incumbent politicians’ performance 
via electoral accountability. Persson and Tabellini (2000) develop a model on decentralization where 
political officials try to minimize effort and maximize the probability of re-election. Unlike in a 
centralized system where bureaucrats are responsible for multiple tasks affecting many jurisdictions, 
decentralization makes bureaucrats deal with only one task specific to a single locality. By better 
linking effort and rewards, decentralization improves the performance of political officials, which can 
be held accountable for their actions by their local constituents.  
                                                 
34 These can result from the lack of tax compliance and the existence of unconditional grants from the central level of 
government to subnational levels. 
35 Indeed, Weingast (2009) notes that for greater competition to be an effective mechanism for policing corruption, the 
following must be satisfied: common market conditions, sufficient subnational authority in decision-making and a hard 
budget constraint. 
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Empirically this is supported by Khemani (2001) who provides evidence for 14 major Indian states 
over the period 1960-92 that voters are more vigilant in monitoring the performance of the state 
government tier in terms of output growth and income inequality compared to the national legislature, 
where they act more myopically. This thus supports the presence of greater government accountability 
in elections at the lower levels of government. Finally, focusing on a sample of more than 110 
countries over the period 1980-95, Adserá et al. (2003) find that electoral accountability and the 
exercise of democracy explain more than half of the variability in the levels of government 
performance and corruption. The reason for this is that informed voters are in a better position to 
discipline politicians, thereby preventing the latter from engaging in political rent creation and 
seeking. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has aimed at providing a practical policy advice regarding a first-order concern in 
industrialized countries, the public deficit. Throughout the analysis, we have argued that one of the 
major factors causing public deficits, corruption, may be addressed by decentralizing public finances. 
Focusing on OECD countries, our article provides extensive empirical support for that proposition. 
The effect of corruption is non-linear: corruption increases public deficit when fiscal decentralization 
is low, but as it rises, the effect becomes smaller, being insignificant at sufficiently high levels of 
decentralization. The result implies heterogeneity in the effect of fiscal decentralization on public 
deficit, in the sense that decentralizing public finances is more likely to reduce fiscal deficits in 
relatively more corrupt countries.  
The case of Greece clearly illustrates the results. This country has a relatively high level of corruption, 
being its average level of public deficit over GDP during the period of analysis of almost 7%, the 
greatest of the sample. Interestingly, Greece is also the most centralized country, with a degree of tax 
decentralization slightly lower than 1%. From our findings, it follows that Greece could reduce public 
deficit by increasing fiscal decentralization. According to the results from the 5-year period panel 
(Table 4, column 8), for this country the effect of corruption on public deficits is 3.1. By increasing 
subnational tax revenue to the level of Poland or France (about 10.5%), the effect would be 2.1, 
leading to a reduction of one percentage point in the public deficit. Compared to combating 
corruption, which requires time to dismantle well-established networks of patronage and rent creation 
and seeking, decentralizing public finances is more feasible to implement, particularly in the short-
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term. Hence, a good policy set would be to combine a program of fight against corruption while 
increasing fiscal decentralization. 
Before making generalizations, a few caveats must be considered. First, we analyze a sample of 
OECD countries. Conclusions derived from our results cannot be in principle extrapolated to 
developing countries for a number of reasons. All our countries are economically developed, 
democratic and with an educated population. Furthermore, despite existing variation in corruption 
levels, OECD countries are relatively less corrupt when compared to many developing countries. 
Therefore, further research is necessary to test our findings in a sample of developing and emerging 
countries. Secondly, the results indicate a stylized fact and suggest but do not prove causality, so 
interpretations must be made carefully and complemented with the extant literature on fiscal 
decentralization. In particular, a proper design of the decentralization program is essential, with 
incentives leading to a responsible fiscal policy (Weingast, 2009). A proper political-institutional 
framework is also necessary to guarantee accountability and citizen control of subnational 
governments. Moreover, a cautious interpretation of our findings implies that using fiscal 
decentralization to mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits is more advisable when 
the country starts from low levels of decentralization, as the case of Greece. When the degree of 
decentralization is already medium or high –as the case of Spain–, the advice of increasing 
decentralization is much less clear. 
Overall, this paper has made a contribution to the literature on decentralization. Our empirical analysis 
has uncovered substantial heterogeneity in the effect of fiscal decentralization depending on the 
institutional context. We find that decentralization behaves as a disciplining mechanism that reduces 
fiscal deficits in a corrupt public environment, but not when corruption is absent. This leads us to an 
interesting theoretical debate. The result suggests that bringing the government closer to the people is 
more useful or necessary when public administration is not working properly. In this case, the agent 
(politicians and public employees) misuses public resources for private gain, and the principal 
(citizens) must monitor closely the former. This is more feasible when the government is close to the 
people, since citizens are better informed about local affairs and can revoke corrupt rulers in elections. 
The argument can be easily extended to related concepts such as political and citizen participation, 
which is supposed to be more necessary when the government does not work well. Likewise, other 
dimensions of the performance of countries may be considered from this perspective, such as social 
policies or environmental quality. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1
Country ICRG corruption
Fiscal decentralization 
(subnational tax revenue)
Public deficit
Two relatively corrupt countries
Greece 2.1 0.9 6.9
vs.
Poland 2.4 10.5 4.6
Two relatively non-corrupt countries
The Netherlands 0.4 3.0 2.6
vs.
Canada 0.4 46.4 2.7
Descriptive comparisons among country-pairs
Notes: The variables represent the average of available data over the period 1986-2010. The
definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix I.  
 
Table 2
ICRG 
corruption
Fiscal decentralization 
(subnational tax revenue)
Public deficit
High corruption 2.43 7.48 3.98
 Low tax decentralization
Greece, The Slovak Republic, The Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Israel. 2.20 3.31 5.73
▪ High tax decentralization
Slovenia, Italy, Poland, Estonia, and 
Korea (Rep.). 2.67 11.64 2.22
Intermediate corruption 1.57 14.13 3.30
 Low tax decentralization
Ireland, Portugal, The United Kingdom, 
Belgium and France. 1.61 6.13 3.64
▪ High tax decentralization
Austria, Spain, Australia, Japan and The 
United States. 1.53 22.13 2.96
Low corruption 0.45 23.23 0.08
 Low tax decentralization
The Netherlands, Luxembourg, New 
Zealand, Norway, Finland and Iceland. 0.36 12.61 -0.99
▪ High tax decentralization
Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland 
and Canada. 0.55 35.97 1.35
Corruption, fiscal decentralization and public deficit
Notes : The variables represent the average of available data over the period 1986-2010. The 
definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix I.
  Averages  by  groups 
Corruption groups/ Countries
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Table 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1.295** 0.812 2.268** 2.702*** 0.872 2.5* 3.926***
(0.56) (0.71) (0.86) (0.9) (0.74) (1.25) (1.39)
-0.071* 0.035 0.068 -0.04 0.018 0.064
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.135** -0.091 -0.061 -0.082*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
-0.078 -0.105 -0.137 -0.101 -0.124
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.11)
-1.587*** -1.708*** -1.449*** -1.5*** -1.17**
(0.41) (0.36) (0.34) (0.38) (0.41)
0.315* 0.328** 0.267** 0.339** 0.309**
(0.16) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14)
-0.311 -0.122 0.093 -0.195 -0.167
(1.03) (0.98) (0.87) (1.06) (1.06)
0.004 0.009* 0.02** 0.006 0.01*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.005)
R-squared 0.53 0.58 0.65 0.29 0.55 0.58 0.31
Number of obs. 31 31 31 31 28 28 28
Marginal effects of corruption for different percentiles of fiscal decentralization
Pct 10 (Tax: 2.1) (Exp.: 12.7) 1.98** 2.51*** 1.73* 2.88***
(0.787) (0.835) (0.848) (0.91)
Pct 20 (Tax: 4.8) (Exp.: 17.5) 1.62** 2.26*** 1.44* 2.49***
(0.71) (0.772) (0.745) (0.77)
Pct 30 (Tax: 5.8) (Exp.: 25) 1.49** 2.18*** 0.98 1.87***
(0.69) (0.757) (0.682) (0.648)
Pct 40 (Tax: 7.7) (Exp.: 27.9) 1.23* 2** 0.81 1.64**
(0.66) (0.739) (0.697) (0.646)
Pct 50 (Tax: 10.5) (Exp.: 30.4) 0.85 1.75** 0.66 1.44**
(0.651) (0.744) (0.727) (0.666)
Pct 60 (Tax: 17.1) (Exp.: 32.6) -0.04 1.15 0.52 1.25*
(0.777) (0.889) (0.765) (0.7)
Pct 70 (Tax: 20.8) (Exp.: 37.1) -0.54 0.81 0.25 0.88
(0.913) (1.029) (0.868) (0.803)
Pct 80 (Tax: 28.3) (Exp.: 43.8) -1.54 0.14 -0.15 0.34
(1.253) (1.373) (1.067) (1.017)
Pct 90 (Tax: 33.1) (Exp.: 55.1) -2.19 -0.3 -0.84 -0.59
(1.502) (1.626) (1.473) (1.462)
Cross-section analysis
Dependent variable is public deficit over GDP
Tax decentralization Expenditure decentralization
Notes : The proxies for tax and expenditure decentralization are subnational tax revenue and subnational govern. expend ., 
respectively. The variables represent the average of available data over the period 1986-2010. The estimations include a
constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. All regressions are estimated with OLS. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Percentiles of tax and expenditure
decentralization are calculated for average values over the period 1986-2010. The definitions of the variables can be found in
Appendix I. The list of countries included in the sample is shown in Table 2.
Ln GDP pc
Population
ICRG corruption
Fiscal decentralization
Corruption x Fiscal 
decent.
Total government 
revenue
Growth GDP pc
Unemployment rate
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Table 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.801*** 1.391*** 0.857* 1.413*** 1.099*** 1.674*** 1.048* 1.516***
(0.16) (0.2) (0.48) (0.47) (0.31) (0.34) (0.62) (0.53)
0.016 0.027 0.019 0.005
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
-0.058*** -0.055* -0.075*** -0.051*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.042* -0.072*** -0.035 -0.06 -0.054 -0.086* 0.062 0.046
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16) (0.14)
-0.482*** -0.494*** -0.582*** -0.536*** -0.882*** -0.911*** -0.425 -0.642**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.18) (0.17) (0.31) (0.28)
0.328*** 0.301*** 0.446*** 0.363*** 0.271*** 0.256*** 0.327* 0.318**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.17) (0.14)
-1.399*** -1.168*** -1.163 -1.08 -1.273** -1.055* -1.023 -1.095
(0.33) (0.34) (0.73) (0.75) (0.6) (0.61) (0.83) (0.77)
0.009*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.007** 0.017*** 0.012 0.019**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.07 0.11 0.57 0.73
Hansen test of overid. rest. 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00
R-squared 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.52
Number of obs. 636 632 636 632 142 142 142 142
Marginal effects of corruption for different percentiles of fiscal decentralization
Pct 10 (Tax: 2.1) 1.27*** 1.3*** 1.52*** 1.41***
(0.189) (0.442) (0.321) (0.521)
Pct 20 (Tax: 4.8) 1.11*** 1.15*** 1.31*** 1.27**
(0.178) (0.415) (0.302) (0.52)
Pct 30 (Tax: 5.8) 1.06*** 1.1*** 1.24*** 1.23**
(0.175) (0.41) (0.297) (0.523)
Pct 40 (Tax: 7.7) 0.94*** 0.99** 1.09*** 1.13**
(0.172) (0.405) (0.292) (0.534)
Pct 50 (Tax: 10.5) 0.78*** 0.84** 0.88*** 0.98*
(0.173) (0.415) (0.294) (0.561)
Pct 60 (Tax: 17.1) 0.39** 0.48 0.38 0.65
(0.197) (0.505) (0.338) (0.664)
Pct 70 (Tax: 20.8) 0.18 0.28 0.1 0.46
(0.221) (0.584) (0.382) (0.741)
Pct 80 (Tax: 28.3) -0.26 -0.13 -0.46 0.09
(0.284) (0.771) (0.493) (0.917)
Pct 90 (Tax: 33.1) -0.54 -0.4 -0.82 -0.16
(0.331) (0.908) (0.576) (1.044)
Notes : The proxy for tax decentralization is subnational tax revenue . The period analyzed is 1986-2010. The estimations include a constant
term and period dummies, which are omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Percentiles of tax decentralization are calculated for average values over the period
1986-2010. The definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix I. The list of countries included in the sample is shown in Table 2.
Regressions 1, 2, 5 and 6 are estimated with OLS. Regressions 3, 4, 7 and 8 are estimated with the one-step system GMM estimator using
the STATA program xtabond (Roodman, 2006), with the orthogonal deviations transformation applied. For the first-difference equation, the
second lag of explanatory variables (all treated as endogenous) are used as instruments. For the level equation, the lagged first-difference of
explanatory variables are used as instruments. The exogenous variables are the period dummies.
Ln GDP pc
Population
Annual data
OLS System GMM estimator
Corruption x Tax 
decent.
Total government 
revenue
Growth GDP pc
Unemployment rate
ICRG corruption
Tax decentralization
5-year average data
OLS System GMM estimator
Panel data analysis. Tax decentralization
Dependent variable is public deficit over GDP
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Table 5
OLS System GMM estimator OLS System GMM estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2.562*** 2.566*** 2.979*** 2.034*
(0.29) (0.65) (0.53) (1.13)
0.042*** 0.044* 0.039 0.032
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.068*** -0.064*** -0.074*** -0.056*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.112*** -0.101 -0.089 -0.079
(0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11)
-0.418*** -0.397*** -0.675*** -0.428
(0.08) (0.09) (0.18) (0.27)
0.264*** 0.31*** 0.186** 0.383*
(0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.22)
-1.538*** -0.959 -1.319** -0.775
(0.35) (0.82) (0.65) (0.93)
0.012*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.01)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.07 0.41
Hansen test of overid. rest. 1.00 1.00
R-squared 0.54 0.54
Number of obs. 492 492 118 118
Marginal effects of corruption for different percentiles of fiscal decentralization
Pct 10 (Exp.: 12.7) 1.7*** 1.75*** 2.03*** 1.32*
(0.209) (0.48) (0.388) (0.8)
Pct 20 (Exp.: 17.5) 1.38*** 1.44*** 1.68*** 1.05
(0.186) (0.429) (0.348) (0.686)
Pct 30 (Exp.: 25) 0.87*** 0.96** 1.11*** 0.63
(0.163) (0.378) (0.313) (0.532)
Pct 40 (Exp.: 27.9) 0.67*** 0.78** 0.9*** 0.47
(0.16) (0.37) (0.311) (0.487)
Pct 50 (Exp.: 30.4) 0.51*** 0.62* 0.72** 0.33
(0.159) (0.369) (0.315) (0.456)
Pct 60 (Exp.: 32.6) 0.36** 0.48 0.55* 0.2
(0.161) (0.373) (0.322) (0.437)
Pct 70 (Exp.: 37.1) 0.05 0.19 0.22 -0.05
(0.17) (0.393) (0.348) (0.426)
Pct 80 (Exp.: 43.8) -0.4** -0.24 -0.28 -0.42
(0.195) (0.449) (0.406) (0.48)
Pct 90 (Exp.: 55.1) -1.17*** -0.97 -1.13** -1.06
(0.259) (0.59) (0.541) (0.696)
Panel data analysis. Expenditure decentralization
Dependent variable is public deficit over GDP
Annual data 5-year average data
Ln GDP pc
Population
Notes : The proxy for expenditure decentralization is subnational govern. expend. The period analyzed is 1986-2010. The estimations include a
constant term and period dummies, which are omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Percentiles of expenditure decentralization are calculated for average values over the period 1986-
2010. The definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix I. The list of countries included in the sample is shown in Table 2. Regressions 1 and
3 are estimated with OLS. Regressions 2 and 4 are estimated with the one-step system GMM estimator using the STATA program xtabond (Roodman,
2006), with the orthogonal deviations transformation applied. For the first-difference equation, the second lag of explanatory variables (all treated as
endogenous) are used as instruments. For the level equation, the lagged first-difference of explanatory variables are used as instruments. The
exogenous variables are the period dummies.
Corruption
Expenditure decentralization
Corruption x Expenditure 
decent.
Total government revenue
Growth GDP pc
Unemployment rate
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Table 7
Corruption indicator : ICRG TI WBGI GCB ICRG TI WBGI GCB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.62*** 0.549*** 0.642*** 0.665*** 0.593** 0.526** 0.607** 0.721**
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) (0.32)
-0.632*** -0.564*** -0.656*** -0.622*** -0.588** -0.525** -0.605** -0.746**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) (0.33)
-0.822*** -0.753*** -0.845*** -0.757*** -0.669** -0.604* -0.685** -0.777**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33)
-0.162*** -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.132** -0.148 -0.145 -0.146 -0.052
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
-0.288*** -0.288*** -0.287*** -0.295*** -0.428** -0.423** -0.427** -0.674***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22)
0.45*** 0.44*** 0.451*** 0.508*** 0.441*** 0.428*** 0.441*** 0.312**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
2.142 1.874 2.05 3.527** 4.901* 4.746* 4.847* 2.48
(1.43) (1.42) (1.43) (1.65) (2.61) (2.58) (2.6) (3.14)
0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.07*** 0.075** 0.075** 0.074** 0.065**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.82
Number of obs. 640 640 640 586 144 144 144 131
Notes : The proxy for tax decentralization is subnational tax revenue . The period analyzed is 1986-2010. The estimations include period
and country dummies, which are omitted for space considerations. All regressions are estimated with the two-way fixed effects estimator.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. The definitions of
the variables can be found in Appendix I. The list of countries included in the sample is shown in Table 2.
Within-country variations. 
Dependent variable is public deficit over GDP
Annual data 5-year average data
Tax decentralization
Ln GDP pc
Population
Tax decent x Interm. corruption
Tax decent x High corruption
Total government revenue
Growth GDP pc
Unemployment rate
 
 
 
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Switzerland
Czech Republic
Germany
Denmark
Spain
Estonia
Finland
FranceUnited Kingdom
Greece
Hungary
IrelandIceland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
New Zealand
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Sweden
United States
Public deficit = -0.01 + 1.65·Corruption
   (t-stat)          (-0.01)   (2.91)
R-squared = 0.23-7
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Notes: The variables represent the average of available data over the period 1986-2010.
The definitions and sources of the variables can be found in Appendix I.
Fig. 1. The relationship between public deficit and corruption  
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Fig. 2. The marginal effect of corruption on public deficit
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The figure corresponds to regression 3 of Table 3.
90% confidence interval.
Panel A: Tax decentralization
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The figure corresponds to regression 6 of Table 3.
90% confidence interval.
Panel B: Expenditure decentralization
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The marginal effect of fiscal decentralization on public deficit
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The figure corresponds to regression 3 of Table 3.
90% confidence interval.
Panel A: Tax decentralization
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The figure corresponds to regression 6 of Table 3.
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Appendix I. Description of variables. 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Banking crisis - fiscal 
cost
Fiscal costs associated with systemic banking crises.The total fiscal cost is 
divided by the years of duration of each crisis. Laeven and Valencia (2012).
Banking crisis - dummy Dummy variable indicating whether the country experiences a systemic banking crisis. Laeven and Valencia (2012).
Bribe payments
Experience-based indicator obtained from the question: “In the past 12 
months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any 
form? ”
Global Corruption Barometer, 
Transparency International 
(several years).
Control of Corruption
Perception-based indicator that measures the level of corruption within the 
political system. Values range between -2.5 (highly clean) and 2.5 (highly 
corrupt).
World Bank Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann et al. , 
2010), from Teorell et al.  (2011).
Corruption Perception 
Index
Perception-based indicator that measures the level of corruption within the 
political system. Values range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly 
corrupt).
Transparency International, from 
Teorell et al.  (2011).
Debt service Net government interest payments, as a percentage of GDP. OECD (2012b).
Democracy (polity2)
“Revised Combined Polity Score” measures the degree of democracy vs. 
autocracy in the political system. The scale ranges from -10 to 20, where a 
higher score means higher democracy.
Polity IV, from Teorell et al. 
(2011).
Federal Dummy whether the country is a federation. Treisman (2002).
Freedom of press
Degree of freedom of press considering legislative regulation, political 
pressure, economic influences and repressive actions. The scale ranges from 
0 to 100, where a higher score means lower freedom.
Freedom House, from Teorell et 
al. (2011).
Government fragment. “Probability that two randomly chosen deputies from among the government parties will be of different parties”
Database of Political Institutions, 
from Teorell et al. (2011).
Growth GDP pc Real per capita  GDP growth (annual %). World Development Indicators (WDI), 2011 (World Bank).
i bond Government bond yield at a 10-year maturity. IMF (2012).
ICRG Corruption
Perception-based indicator that assesses the presence of corruption within the 
political system. We rescale the variable so that higher score means more 
corruption. The scale ranges from 0 to 6. 
ICRG (PRS
Group).
Inflation Ln (1+ inflation), where inflation is consumer prices (annual %). WDI, 2011 (World Bank).
Ln GDP pc Logarithm of real per capita  GDP (constant 2000 US$). WDI, 2011 (World Bank).
Openness Trade (exports and imports) (% of GDP). WDI, 2011 (World Bank).
Parliament fragment. “Probability that two randomly chosen deputies in the legislature belong to different parties.”
Database of Political Institutions, 
from Teorell et al. (2011).
Population Total population, in millions. WDI, 2011 (World Bank).
Public deficit Government deficit (net borrowing) as a percentage of GDP. OECD (2012b).
Subnational govern. 
expend.
Subnational (state/regional and local) government expenditure as percentage 
of total general government expenditure. OECD (2012a).
Subnational tax revenue Subnational (state/regional and local) tax revenue as percentage of total general government tax revenue. OECD (2012a).
TD1
Subnational (state/regional and local) tax revenue as percentage of total 
general government tax revenue, considering only those taxes in which 
subnational units have powers over tax rates and/or tax bases.
Stegarescu (2005) and OECD 
(2012a).
Total government 
revenue Total receipts of general government, as a percentage of GDP. OECD (2012b).
Unemployment rate Share of the labor force without employment but available to work and seeking employment. WDI, 2011 (World Bank).  
 
